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QUENTIN MEILLASSOUX
A NEW FRENCH PHILOSOPHER
Graham Harman
This article is a review of Après la finitude,
the remarkable debut book of Quentin
Meillassoux.1 In my estimation, this work is
one of the most important to appear in continental philosophy in recent years, and deserves a wide readership at the earliest possible
date. An English translation by Ray Brassier
will be published by Continuum in the near future.2
Meillassoux’s book is written in a lucid and
economical style, covering abundant terrain in
just 165 pages. It offers bold readings of the
history of philosophy—Aristotle is not realist
enough, Hume not skeptical enough. It shows
bursts of scathing wit, as when drawing wry
parallels between the anti-Darwinian reveries
of creationism and major schools of presentday philosophy. Most importantly, Après la
finitude offers a ruthless attack on virtually all
of post-Kantian philosophy, now labeled as
“correlationism,” and proposes an original
“speculative” solution (though not in Hegel’s
sense) to the Kantian impasse. Meillassoux
proposes nothing less than a return of philosophy to the absolute, which for him means reality in itself apart from any relation to humans.
The critical portions of the book strike me as
definitive: much of what we know as analytic
and continental philosophy looks rather different following his assault on correlationism.
Meillassoux’s own ideas, plausibly described
as the mere antechamber to a larger and still
unpublished system, lie open to possible objections. Nonetheless, his appeal to an “ancestral” realm prior to all human access succeeds
in defining an unexpected new battlefield for
continental thought. Barely forty years old, he
seems likely to emerge as one of the important
names in European philosophy in the decades
to come.
We should begin by situating Meillassoux
among the more established contemporary
thinkers. For many years, continental philosophy in the Anglophone world was dominated

by Heidegger and Derrida. Neither of these
figures will soon disappear from radar, and
Heidegger is now celebrated as a classic for the
ages even by mainstream analytic thinkers.
But since the mid-1990s, the HeideggeroDerridean brand of continental thought has
faced increasing competition from new trends:
initially from the books of Gilles Deleuze, and
more recently from the heterodox tag team of
Alain Badiou and a resurgent Slavoj ±Zi¡zek.
While major works by these “new” authors
have been available for many years, what is
more recent is their increased momentum
among the younger generation of continental
philosophers. In terms of background and orientation, Meillassoux is not difficult to place
among these currents. He was a student of
Badiou, and the preface to the book is written
by Badiou himself, who can barely find sufficient words to praise it—by fusing absolute
logical necessity with a radical contingency of
the laws of nature, Meillassoux is said to “open
in the history of philosophy . . . a new path foreign to Kant’s canonical distribution between
‘dogmatism,’ ‘scepticism,’ and ‘critique.’”3
Furthermore, despite the absence of set-theory
notation and other known Badiouian flourishes, there are obvious points of similarity between teacher and student: the major role for
mathematics, including the anointment of
Georg Cantor as a pivotal figure for philosophy; the fondness for step-by-step logical argumentation; the absence of any especial interest in Heidegger or the phenomenological
tradition. Both authors also display grand systematic ambitions of a kind that seemed unthinkable in our field a short time ago. Nonetheless, Meillassoux’s vision of the world is
not Badiou’s, and certain aspects of the former
even cut against the grain of the latter. According to published information, Meillassoux was
born in 1967 in Paris, son of the economic anthropologist Claude Meillassoux (1925–
2005), an intellectual maverick in his own
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right. He is a graduate of the Ecole Normale
Supérieure, and has been employed at that institution for the past decade. Although Après
la finitude is Quentin Meillassoux’s first book,
anecdotal evidence suggests that he was generally known and highly regarded in Paris well
beyond Badiou’s circle even before the book
appeared.
The very title After Finitude will be enough
to startle present-day continental thought,
since human finitude has been perhaps the central credo of the field from the time of its birth.
The book consists of two opening critical
chapters followed by two longer and more systematic chapters, closing with a short fifth
chapter that harks back to the opening critique.
Since Meillassoux himself agrees that Chapters 1, 2, and 5 can be taken as a unit,4 quite
apart from whether the reader accepts the
philosophical standpoint outlined in Chapters
3 and 4, the present review is organized according to this schema. Beginning with
Meillassoux’s onslaught against the Copernican Revolution of Kant, I will move to his
more challenging attempt to establish a mathematical ontology that abandons the principle
of sufficient reason, before closing with a brief
assessment of the book as a whole.
Against Correlationism
One of the typical features of recent continental thought is its contempt for so-called
“naïve realism.” The human being is now
firmly established as the point of entry for all
serious philosophy, even if redefined as a pure
ego, linguistic agent, embodied animal, subject of power-plays, or historically rooted
Dasein. The notion of an objective world-in-itself seems to elude our grasp. Nonetheless,
few authors have faced this predicament with
full-blown absolute idealism à la Berkeley—if
not quite “naïve,” such extreme idealism
strikes most of us as gratuitous and bizarre
amidst the undeniable blows of the world. This
leaves philosophy in an ambiguous position,
neither realist nor idealist. The obvious roots
of this ambiguity lie in the Copernican Revolution of Kant, still the basic philosophical horizon of both the analytics and the continentals.
Meillassoux’s book ends with the daring claim
that Kant’s Revolution is in fact “a Ptolemaic
Counter-Revolution (163),”5 one that makes

philosophy revolve around humans at the precise moment when modern science had
plunged into the world itself. In the wake of
Kant’s genius, we are too clever to believe in
direct access to things in themselves, but also
too sober to construct wild solipsistic theories
that reduce the world to nothing but our own
production. The favored middle-ground position for philosophers has been what
Meillassoux calls “correlationism” (18). The
correlationist holds that we can neither conceive of humans without world, nor of world
without humans, but must root all philosophy
in a correlation or rapport between the two.
The term “correlationism” strikes me as a
devastating summary of post-Kantian thought.
On the continental side, we find Husserl pleading for objectivity against psychologism while
also defending ideality against the natural sciences; we have Heidegger claiming that reality
neither exists nor fails to exist in the absence of
Dasein; more recently, we see ±Zi¡zek describe
the Real as solely a gap in the world posited by
the mad human subject, even while denying
that he is an idealist. On the analytic side, there
is the “as if” of Blackburn’s quasi-realism; the
internal exile of Putnam’s internal realism; and
Davidson’s refusal to take the realism/anti-realism dispute seriously. All these positions,
and countless others, join in allegiance to what
Meillassoux calls the “correlational circle”
(19). As he wonderfully puts it: “we will
henceforth term correlationism every current
of thought that upholds the uncircumventible
character of the correlation understood in this
way. Thus, we can say that every philosophy
that claims not to be a naïve realism has become a variant of correlationism” (18). The
correlationist argument, often left vague or entirely unstated, holds that any attempt to think
reality-in-itself automatically turns it into
something not in-itself—since, after all, we
are now thinking about it (17). On this basis,
there is supposedly no way to reach the world
an sich, but only a global correlation of human
and world. Philosophy has lost what
Meillassoux calls le Grand Dehors, “the Great
Outside.” In its place, we find that “this space
of the outside is hence only the space of that
which faces us, of that which exists only on the
basis of a vis-à-vis with our own existence. . . .
We do not transcend very far beyond ourselves
when diving into such a world: we are content
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to explore the two faces of something that remains a face-to-face” (21). This correlate need
not take the form of the old subject/object dualism. Indeed, most present-day philosophers
unite in heaping scorn upon the antiquated
model of subject and object. But this does not
prevent them from remaining locked in the
modern dance-step of correlationism. In particular, Meillassoux cites Heidegger’s supposedly “more originary” correlation of being and
thought in Ereignis as an example of how the
rejection of subject and object does not quite
get us off the correlationist hook (22). As
Meillassoux sees it, all postcritical philosophy
is correlationism (23)—or else a relapse into
metaphysics, as with Whitehead and perhaps
even the vitalism of Deleuze.6 Before Kant,
philosophers dueled over who had the best
model of substance: was it perfect forms, individual beings, prime matter, atoms, or God?
Since Kant, these “naïve” disputes have been
replaced by combat over who has the best
model of the human-world correlate: is it subject-object, noesis-noema, Dasein-Sein, or
language-referent? In Meillassoux’s eyes,
“co” has become the dominant particle of the
philosopher’s lexicon (19), just as “always already” (21) has become the beloved phrase of
those who grant extra-human reality only
when we ourselves posit it retroactively. Yes,
they tell us, the world exists in itself—but only
for us (26).
The work of Quentin Meillassoux is meant
as a clean break with all forms of correlationism, and he approaches the task with unusual
boldness. He begins by drawing up a table of
a c t u a l sc i e n t i fi c d a t e s (k n ow n t o
Heideggerians as “mere ontic information”):
13.5 billion years since the Big Bang, 4.45 billion since the formation of the earth, 3.5 billion
since life began on our planet, and just two million years since the appearance of homo
habilis (24). He asks us to consider the status
of statements about ancient events predating
the relatively recent appearance of human beings, those pampered tyrants of correlational
philosophy. For those entities that exist prior to
all human life, Meillassoux coins the term
“archifossil,” and describes them as having
“ancestrality” (24–26). In his view, the
correlationists will always be at a loss when
trying to deal with the ancestral archifossil.
Their likely maneuver is a predictable one: the

correlationist will not admit that a being actually exists prior to being given to humans, but
only that it is given to humans as existing prior
to such givenness (32). They will say that “the
physical universe is not really known to precede the existence of humans, or at least the existence of living creatures; the world has
meaning only as given to a living or thinking
being” (33). They will try to reduce scientific
statements about ancestral stellar explosions
and mudslides to the means of scientific
givenness of these events, just as in positivism
or verificationism. “We can therefore say that
the statement is true . . . without naively believing that its truth results from an adequation
with the actual reality of its referent (a world
without givenness of world)” (ibid.).
This correlationist attitude toward science
is at the same time both modest and condescending. For on the one hand it leaves nature
entirely to the sciences, laying no claim to the
objective world for philosophy at all. But simultaneously, it holds that there is something
more in the world that science cannot grasp (cf.
Heidegger’s “science does not think”)—a
“logical” priority of statements about the
world over the “chronological” priority of ancestral events themselves (32). In so doing,
correlationists play the game of pretending
that they do not interfere with the content of
scientific statements. Yet interfere they do. For
if scientific statements about the archifossil are
not taken literally, they lose meaning altogether. The statement that the earth was
formed 4.5 billion years ago means exactly
what it says. It does mean what the
correlationists claim, namely that “it is not
ancestrality that precedes givenness, it is the
present given that retroactively projects a past
that seems ancestral” (34). For this is no longer
the same statement as that of the scientists, and
its supposedly agnostic attitude toward the real
world cannot hide a form of crypto-idealism,
since it tacitly dismisses all forms of realism as
naïve. Although Meillassoux’s book does not
openly equate correlationism with idealism,
he does give an important hint along these
lines: “faced with the archifossil, all idealisms
converge and become equally extraordinary”
(36). Insofar as Berkeley, Hegel, Heidegger,
and Derrida all have equally little to tell us
about events on the moon fifty million years
ago, they all look like extreme idealists as soon
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as the archifossil rears its head. Just as some
creationists claim that God planted pseudo-ancient fossils in the ground to test the Biblical
faith of scientists, Meillassoux suggests acidly
that his notion of the archifossil may serve to
“test the philosopher’s faith in the correlates,
even in the presence of data that indicate an
abyssal gap between that which exists and that
which appears” (ibid.). For this reason, the
problem of ancestrality is capable of overturning everything in philosophy since Kant (37).
Moreover, as Meillassoux states at the close of
his book, this problem would not disappear
even if humans and the world had been created
simultaneously—for in this case it still might
have been otherwise, and hence the archifossil
could still be reflected upon as a possibility
(156–57). In passing, it should be said that this
reformulation is perhaps too limited. It seems
to me that the correlationist circle would be
threatened not just by archifossils dating to before the emergence of the human species, but
equally so by “extrafossils” lying outside current human access, such as objects locked in
hidden vaults or refrigerators, or unknown oil
reserves trapped beneath the ocean floor. After
all, events unfolding right now in the core of
Alpha Centauri actually happen inside that
star, and not in the core of Alpha Centauri “for
us.”
In any case, Meillassoux holds that
correlationism and naïve realism are two separate ways of dodging the question of
ancestrality (38). By contrast with his detailed
analysis of correlationism, his arguments
against naïve realism are somewhat sketchy
throughout the book, though this can perhaps
be explained by the limited number of naïve
realists practicing philosophy today.
Meillassoux insists that philosophy must seek
nothing less than the absolute, abandoning its
fixation on the transcendental conditions of
human experience (39). Nonetheless, “we can
no longer be metaphysicians, we can no longer
be dogmatists. On this point, we can only be
the heirs of Kantianism” (40).
The great failing of metaphysics, for Meillassoux, is that it always seeks some particular
necessary being; in this respect, he seems in
accord with the Heidegger/Derrida critique of
ontotheology. As can be seen from the history
of ontological proofs for the existence of God,
metaphysics holds that at least one being must

be necessary. The Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason goes even further, entailing that
all beings are necessary. But for Meillassoux,
“the rejection of dogmatic metaphysics means
the rejection of all real necessity: and a fortiori
the rejection of the principle of reason, as well
as the ontological proof” (46). What disappears in his argument is the Heideggerian appeal to the limits of finitude, or the
postmodernist’s agnostic uncertainty as to
whether there is any necessity out there or not.
As we will see below, Meillassoux holds that
the laws of nature must be absolutely contingent. In this manner, without relapsing into the
dogmatic tradition he loathes, Meillassoux restores a style of absolutist argument to
continental philosophy that has been absent
for decades, if not centuries.
Setting the table for his own position,
Meillassoux draws a convincing distinction
between “weak” and “strong” versions of
correlationism. A good example of a weak
correlationist is Kant, for whom the things
themselves cannot be known, but can at least
be thought. Kant’s critical position “does not
forbid all connection of thought with the absolute” (48). By contrast, strong correlationism
(which includes most continental thinkers of
the present day), holds that “it is equally illegitimate to claim that we are able, at least, to
think [the in-itself]” (ibid.). The strong
correlationist and the full-blown idealist agree
that things themselves are not even thinkable.
But whereas the hyper-idealist holds that we
gain the absolute through the very conditions
of all human thought, the strong correlationist
refuses to follow, and is resigned to the
facticity or finitude of human experience, devoid of all reference to the absolute. In other
words, strong correlationism abandons Kant
by holding that “just as we can only describe
the a priori forms of sensibility and understanding, we can only describe the logical
principles inherent in any thinkable proposition, but not deduce their absolute truth” (53).
The result is a philosophy of facticity, which
“is concerned with the supposed structural
invariants of the world—invariants that can
differ from one correlationism to another, but
which play in each case the role of a minimal
prescriptive order for thought: the principle of
causality, the forms of perception, logical
laws” (54). These invariant forms are taken as
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a purely given fact of which no change is ever
experienced, but they are not thereby taken as
something absolute. They are merely found
and described—the basic Kantian method still
used by strong correlationism in our own time,
as in Heidegger’s existential analytic of
Dasein. Breaking with this tradition of factical
description, Meillassoux wants to turn
facticity into absolute contingency: “contingency signifies the fact that physical laws
indifferently permit an event either to occur or
not to occur—permit a being to arise, endure,
or perish” (ibid.).
Meillassoux notes a close link between
facticity and the postmodern brand of philosophical religiosity. Stripped of all access to
the absolute, the philosophy of finitude seems
impeccably modest in its claims about the
world. But this attitude is by no means harmless, since it really allows us to make any statements about the absolute that we please. As he
puts it, “the end of metaphysics conceived as a
‘de-absolutization of thought’ thus consists in
the legitimation by reason of any religious (or
‘poetico-religious’) belief in the absolute
whatever” (64), on the sole condition that no
one claim to give rational grounds for such belief. The end of metaphysics, in banishing all
traces of the absolute from philosophy, has in
fact opened philosophy to the dominance of an
exacerbated form of religiosity—in which philosophy becomes the handmaid of a
correlationist theology of the shapeless Beyond, unfettered by even the barest logical
constraints. Whereas a Christian disciple of
Kant at least needed to demonstrate that the
Trinity is not logically contradictory (60), even
this minimal obligation has now vanished.
Strong correlationism’s apparent modesty toward the absolute has in fact opened the gates
to every possible form of arbitrary belief. As
Meillassoux puts it, in what may prove to be
the most popular phrase of his book: “the
better armed thought is against dogmatism, the
more powerless it seems to be against fanaticism” (67). Stripped of all logical armament
thanks to the strong correlationists, we are left
with nothing but meager critiques of fanaticism in purely moral terms, reduced to
complaining about the arrogance or bad
practical effects of whichever fanatics we
happen to dislike (65).

Against this empty fideism (which is found
even in self-proclaimed atheists), and against
violent fanaticism as its key historical symptom, “it is important to rediscover in philosophy a touch of the absolute” (68). This appeal
to the absolute has not been heard in continental philosophy for a good long time, but
Meillassoux is serious. Despite his obvious admiration for Kant, he refers to “the Kantian catastrophe” (171) in philosophy, by which he
means the correlationist catastrophe. The great
hope of Meillassoux’s book, as proclaimed in
its final sentences, is that the theme of ancestral things themselves might awaken us from
our “correlational slumber” (178). Against the
post-Kantian assumption that philosophers
must “content [themselves] with showing the
general conditions of givenness of phenomena” (174), ancestral events must be regarded
as existing in themselves, not just as events for
us. Instead of the transcendental idealism that
silently dominates philosophy in our time,
Meillassoux advocates a “speculative materialism” (169). While this phrase is little developed in the present book, it is sufficiently apt
as a description of his standpoint that I would
expect it to return in force in his future works.
But Meillassoux does not leave us hanging
with these critical arguments against
correlationism. He also gives us a considerable
taste of his own philosophy, in which “it is a
matter of holding firmly to the Cartesian thesis
that whatever can be mathematized can be
absolutized, without reviving the principle of
reason. And this strikes us as a task that is not
only possible, but urgent” (175). The essential
criteria of all mathematical statements will be
transformed into necessary conditions of the
contingency of every being. This notion harks
back to the opening words of Meillassoux’s
book, deliberately unmentioned until now:
“The theory of primary and secondary qualities seems to belong to a hopelessly out-ofdate philosophical past. It is time to rehabilitate it” (13). Secondary qualities, of course, are
those held to exist only in relation to a
perceiver, whereas primary qualities are those
that exist outside of all perception. While
strong correlationism gives a de facto endorsement of Berkeley’s view that all qualities exist
only in their relation to a perceiver,
Meillassoux restores to the world “a touch of
the absolute” by arguing that “for anything in
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the object that can be formulated in mathematical terms, it is meaningful to speak of it as a
property of the object in-itself” (16). In short,
Meillassoux’s speculative materialism is an attempt to fuse absolute mathematical necessity
with an equally absolute contingency of
beings in the natural world. We will now
examine the way that he reaches this strange
hybrid position.
Meillassoux’s Speculative Position
Chapters 3 and 4 give us the heart of
Meillassoux’s argument, and presumably the
seeds of his future work as well. We have seen
that correlationist philosophy undercuts naïve
realism by holding that humans and the world
(or their more sophisticated variants) make
sense only as codependent terms. Yet by reducing ancestral reality to reality-for-us,
correlationism fails to do it justice. One approach to this impasse would be a kind of subjective idealism. Namely, we could decide that
the facticity of the human/world correlate
gives us a new kind of absolute, one that comprises a novel form of the an sich. We would
then have an actual new form of knowledge,
not just a limitation on knowledge; the an sich
would no longer lie in some inaccessible beyond, but would be unveiled from the
structural features of the correlate itself (72).
Meillassoux rejects this option, since it is
no better suited than strong correlationism to
describing the ancestral independence of the
world. Instead, in the key maneuver of the
book, he shifts our focus from the conditions
of the correlate back to the things of the world:
“the supreme necessity of the correlational circle is going to appear to us as the contrary of
what it seems: facticity will be revealed as a
knowledge of the absolute, because we are going to put back into the things that which we
have mistaken for an incapacity of thought”
(72). What Meillassoux intends is to transform
the disavowal of sufficient reason from a poignant limitation on finite human knowledge
into a positive principle of contingency in the
things themselves. As he boldly puts it: “the
failure of the principle of reason, from this perspective, thus results quite simply from the falsity (the absolute falsity, even) of such a principle. For in truth, nothing has a reason for being
and for remaining as it is rather than other-

wise” (73). In place of the famous Leibnizian
principle, Meillassoux offers a new principle
of absolute unreason in the things. The
correlationist will respond, of course, that we
cannot be sure that things themselves are contingent, but only that they are contingent insofar as we know them. Against this predictable
objection, Meillassoux demonstrates that
correlationism itself already presupposes the
very principle that he advocates. “To oppose
[the correlationist], there is only one way to
proceed: we need to show that the correlational
circle . . . if it is thinkable, itself presupposes
the tacit concession that contingency is
absolute” (74).
Throughout the book, Meillassoux displays
an almost Hegelian gift for counterposing multiple arguments, turning them around from
various dizzying angles, and finally selecting a
winner for the clearest and subtlest of reasons.
Hence, it is no wonder that the central argument of his book hinges on an imaginary discussion between five separate philosophical
characters. As if he were setting up a dirty joke
or a Brunoesque dialogue between philosophers and clowns, Meillassoux relates the following scenario: two dogmatists—a Christian
and an atheist—are arguing about the afterlife,
and along comes a correlationist. Each of the
dogmatists (I like to imagine them as wearing,
respectively, a bishop’s outfit and a Jacobin
liberty cap) is absolutely sure of his views. Either there is a God who preserves the soul after
death, or there is not. The correlationist now
walks up and counters both dogmatists with a
strict form of agnosticism: for how can either
character be so sure of reality-in-itself, given
that we are limited to our own human access to
the world, unable to penetrate to a world-in-itself lying beyond (75)? But along comes yet
another character: a “subjective idealist,” who
“declares that [the correlationist] upholds a
position just as inconsistent as those of the
[dogmatists]. For all three think that there
could be an in-itself radically different from
our present state: a God inaccessible to natural
reason, or a pure nothingness” (ibid., my italics). Since the subjective idealist makes the human-world correlate utterly absolute, he regards it as impossible even to conceive of its
destruction by death: “since an in-itself different from the for-us is unthinkable, the idealist
proclaims it to be impossible” (ibid.). Of all
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four characters, Meillassoux holds that the agnostic correlationist is closest to the truth,
since it is only he who realizes that things
might well be otherwise than we think. After
all, each of the dogmatists is trapped in a particular positive doctrine, and the subjective
idealist is trapped in an undogmatic but still
prison-like correlate. Only the agnostic acknowledges that death and the afterlife are
both thinkable without turning them into dogmatic proclamations.
With the field reduced to a sole survivor, a
new rival appears: the speculative philosopher
(i.e., Meillassoux himself). This novel figure
proceeds to dethrone the correlationist by
showing that our possible destruction by death
reflects not just the agnostic’s limited knowledge, but rather an absolute possibility. How
so? The argument runs as follows. Note that
the correlationist’s agnosticism has to allow
for the possibility that one of the two
dogmatisms may well be correct. For if he disallows the possible truth of any dogmatism,
then he is effectively stating that the correlate
is an absolutely unsurpassable horizon—and
the subjective idealist wins. Put differently,
each of the three other characters allows for
only one absolute solution: for the Christian it
is the afterlife; for the atheist it is annihilation;
f o r t h e s u b j e c t ive i d e a l i s t i t i s t h e
unsurpassable correlate itself. Initially, it is
only the agnostic correlationist who leaves
open the possibility that any of these three absolutes may be correct. The speculative philosopher merely adds an additional twist: namely,
if the correlationist is to avoid becoming a subjective idealist, he cannot allow the openness
of possibilities to be just one possible option
among others. The agnostic correlationist’s
entire argument hinges on replacing absolute
Christianity, atheism, or subjective idealism
with an absolute openness. And for this reason,
he is forced to throw in his lot with
Meillassoux’s speculative position. After all,
the very possibility of distinguishing between
a for-us and an in-itself at all requires that it be
absolutely possible that there is more to reality
than is currently visible in the correlational circle. In short, the agnostic is not an agnostic
when it comes to agnosticism, but must be absolutely agnostic.
Another way to view the situation is that
there are really only two options. Either we

emphasize the contingent facticity of the correlate and thereby remove its absolute status,
or we disavow this contingent facticity in order
to turn the correlate itself into absolute reality,
and thereby become subjective idealists. No
middle ground is possible. Meillassoux
chooses the former path, arriving at his speculative position by simply radicalizing what the
correlationists already presuppose—namely,
the possibility that there might be something
in-itself different from what appears to us. If
we fail to accept this possible difference, then
we either absolutize subjective experience
(like the subjective idealist) or plunge into our
preferred dogma (like the Christian and the
atheist). The irony is that Meillassoux goes beyond correlationism by radicalizing its own internal conditions; this has possible implications worth considering at the end of this
review. But for anyone who concludes too
quickly that this leads him to a metaphysics
privileging human being, Meillassoux has a
ready counterargument: “we do not contend
that it is necessary that some specific being exist, but rather that it is absolutely necessary
that any being is capable of not exisiting” (82,
my italics). If it were otherwise, we would
have metaphysics in the bad sense, a humanized ontotheology, whereas “[my] thesis is
rather speculative—one thinks an absolute—
without being metaphysical—one thinks nothing (no specific being) which would be absolute. The absolute is the absolute impossibility
of a necessary being” (ibid). The principle of
sufficient reason is replaced by a global unreason, an inherently negative term later replaced
by the more positive “factuality.” Whereas the
facticity of a situation points to its sheer
contingency, the very structure of facticity is
not itself contingent, and this non-facticity of
facticity itself is what is given the name
“factual” (107).
Since everything is contingent, it is only the
principle of unreason that can be regarded as
eternal, absolute, and “anhypothetical” in Aristotle’s sense (i.e., one of those things for
which no demonstration can or needs to be
provided) (84).7 Absolute contingency does
not mean that “all must perish,” since this
would entail a metaphysics of permanent flux,
whereas Meillassoux’s principle remains neutral on the question of flux versus stasis. His
notion of contingency applies equally well to a
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Heraclitean universe of fiery flow and an icy
Parmenidean cosmos locked in a single permanent form. What his position rejects is the
strong correlationist’s lingering belief in a
cryptic, unknown ground of things: “This belief in the ultimate Reason reveals the true nature of strong correlationism: it is not an abandonment of the principle of reason, but rather
the apology for a belief in this very principle, a
belief that has [simply] become disconnected
from reason.” By contrast, “speculation consists . . . in accentuating the extraction of
thought from the principle of reason, even to
the point of conferring upon this extraction a
principial form, the sole form permitting us to
grasp that that there is absolutely no ultimate
Reason—whether thinkable or unthinkable.”
And even more succinctly, “there is nothing
beneath or beyond the manifest gratuity of the
given—nothing, except for the limitless and
lawless power of its destruction, emergence,
and preservation” (86).
Many readers will at first reject this menacing vision of hyper-chaos, with its apparently
monstrous consequences. Compared to our
usual model of nature, it seems to be such a disaster as to leave no hope of approaching the
a n c e s t r a l r e a l m o f sc i e n c e . I n d e e d ,
Meillassoux is aware of the possible objection
that he has achieved very little—whereas the
skeptic already says that the in-itself might be
anything at all without our knowing it, speculative thought merely adds that we do know it
(88). But this apparently meager addition contains the germ of Meillassoux’s entire philosophy. Since he knows that contingency is necessary and eternal, and that only contingency is
such, his basic philosophical method will consist in deducing all those conditions that a
thing must fulfill in order to be contingent
(90). As a first step, Meillassoux tries to use his
principle of unreason to verify Kant’s views
that: (a) the in-itself is never contradictory, and
(b) that there must be an in-itself. He does this
over the course of fifteen subtle pages which
are a pleasure to read, but whose exact argumentation cannot be reproduced in a short review like this one. A brief summary of his results will have to suffice. Meillassoux first tries
to establish that the in-itself can never be contradictory. He makes the fascinating claim that
this goes even beyond Aristotle’s principle of
non-contradiction, since the Aristotelian prin-

ciple refers only to the unthinkability of contradiction, whereas the contradiction
Meillassoux is thinking of should be truly impossible in its own right. He follows an intriguing line of argument to the effect that if contradictory beings existed, they would be
necessary—after all, a contradictory being
would lack true determinacy, and hence would
face no alterity that would render it contingent
and limited. Hence they must be impossible,
since we have already established an absolute
contingency of beings, such that necessary beings are ipso facto impossible (92ff.). At this
point Meillassoux offers a useful historical
comparison that situates his views more
clearly. Leibniz upheld the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. On the
other side of the coin, we could say that
Heidegger and Wittgenstein rejected both
principles, since both are strong correlationists
who reject any absolute statements about the
beyond. Then there is Hegel, who kept the
principle of sufficient reason while abandoning non-contradiction. Finally, Meillassoux
emerges as a kind of inverse Hegel: defending
non-contradiction while abolishing sufficient
reason (97).
The second step is to justify Kant’s other
principle: namely, that there must be an in-itself. This hinges for Meillassoux on the realization that our facticity is not itself just a fact,
but is something necessary. To doubt the necessity of my facticity and thereby turn it into
something merely contingent and susceptible
of mere description, I have to presuppose that
my facticity might be otherwise, but this statement contradicts itself. “In order to doubt the
necessity of something, I ought in fact to admit, as we have seen, that its facticity is thinkable as absolute. For in order that the world in
its entirety should be capable of being thought
as not being, or not being such as it is, I ought
to admit that its possible non-being, its
facticity, is thinkable for me as an absolute (in
such a way that it is more than a correlate of
thought)” (100). In short, while everything in
the world has an absolute facticity, this is not
true of facticity itself, which cannot merely be
something given and described. Instead,
facticity is something that must be deduced,
something with a logical necessity that I see no
reason not to call a priori. This step into a
sphere of logical deductions beyond the con-
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tingent finitude of Kantian or phenomenological description, “far from leading to something irrational, allows for the constitution of a
space of rather precise problems, in which a logos is progressively able to unfold the axes of
its argumentation” (107). With the downfall of
finitude, we enter a space where philosophy
gains renewed confidence in the power of reason and the logical deducibility of numerous
truths. Meillassoux, ostensibly an advocate of
unreason, is in fact a champion of mathematical reason in the high Cartesian style. Indeed,
he seeks a “passage of truth from the Kantian
in-itself to a Cartesian in-itself” that would
take us beyond the logical principle of noncontradiction to an absolutization of mathematical discourse (109). With a tantalizing
hint at his future work, Meillassoux concedes
that he “cannot present here the full solution to
this problem” (ibid.).
In a striking interlude on the nature of philosophy, he states that “philosophy is the invention of strange arguments, necessarily bordering on sophistry—which remains its dark
structural double. In fact, philosophizing always consists in deploying an idea that imposes an original argumentative regime in order to be defended or explored” (103). The
backbone of Meillassoux’s new way of thinking appears earlier on the same page, in the following lucid summary: “non-metaphysical
speculation consists, in the first place, in stating that the thing in itself is nothing other than
the facticity of transcendental forms of representation. It consists, in the second place, in
deducing from the absolute status of this
facticity the properties that Kant himself was
content to accept as evident” (ibid.). In this
way, Meillassoux sketches a world in which
each thing is contingent and self-contained,
capable of being utterly different from what it
is, and absolutely unconnected to anything
else by any ground or reason. This leads him
into a confrontation with David Hume in
Chapter 4, since Meillassoux like Hume seems
faced with a world of chaos-without-cause.
But whereas Hume was concerned only with
our inability to know any causal sources of
things, Meillassoux faces a more difficult
predicament—for he has gone so far as to
declare absolutely that there is, in reality itself,
no reason.

If we gaze through the crack that is thereby
opened on the absolute, we discover a rather
menacing power . . . able to destroy both things
and worlds; able to give rise to monsters of
illogicism; able just as well never to come about
at all; surely able to produce every dream, but
every nightmare as well; able to undergo frenetic and disordered changes or, alternatively,
to produce a universe immobile down to its innermost recesses. Like a cloud bearing the most
fearful tempests, the most unfamiliar lightningflashes. . . . An Omnipotence equal to that of
Descartes’ God, capable of everything, including the inconceivable. But an Omnipotence that
would be disordered, blind, divorced from other
divine perfections, and rendered autonomous.
A power with neither goodness nor wisdom, unable to guarantee to thought that its distinct
ideas are true. (87–88)

In other words, the quickest objection to
Meillassoux’s position would be that he allows the laws of nature to change wildly and
without notice. Many readers will continue to
insist that the laws of nature must be necessary—but in a mysterious physical sense that
undercuts Meillassoux’s absolute contingency, since he dares to speak of an absolute
unreason in the world rather than just a limitation on knowledge. But Meillassoux counters
“that we can sincerely accept that objects are
capable, actually and without any reason, of
displaying the most capricious behavior, without thereby modifying the usual everyday relation that we have with things” (114–15). As he
sees it, dogmatists, skeptics, and transcendental philosophers all share a belief in causation,
with some of them merely doubting that the
causal sources of things can be known. He
states that the same is true of Hume, who continues to “[believe] blindly in the world that
the metaphysicians believed themselves capable of demonstrating” (124). Whether or not
one accepts this reading of Hume, it is certainly true that he did not advocate a flat-out
absolute contingency of the kind found in the
book now being reviewed.
For Meillassoux, the real problem is not the
necessity of laws of nature, but their stability,
two themes that are easily confused. He reformulate Hume’s problem as follows: “if laws
are regarded as contingent and not necessary,
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how does it happen that their contingency is
not manifest in the form of radical and continuous change?” (125). It is often believed that the
apparent constancy of the physical world refutes contingency. After all, if the laws of nature could change, it is assumed that they
would have to change frequently. Evidently,
they do not; hence, the laws of nature must not
be contingent (128–29). To fully overturn this
usual line of reasoning, which Meillassoux
calls “the frequential implication,” he will
need to show how stability emerges from out
of chaos. In the present book, he confines himself to the negative first step of showing that
the frequentialist argument does not work. He
takes as his target a book that he greatly admires, written in the early 1980s by one JeanRené Vernes.8
Vernes’ book, “written in a concise manner
worthy of the philosophers of the seventeenth
century” (130) (as is equally true of
Meillassoux’s own book) tries to render more
explicit the reasons that Hume and Kant believe in necessary laws. Vernes himself defends the frequentialist argument, but by making it more explicit than his forerunners,
Meillassoux thinks he exposes its weaknesses
all the more. As Vernes sees it, we are able to
pass from the apparent stability of physical
laws to their necessity by following a probabilistic line of reasoning. If we imagine the collision of Hume’s proverbial billiard balls, we
notice a contrast between the countless a priori
possibilities of things that could occur when
the balls strike one another, and the limited
number of repeated deflections that do in fact
seem to occur. Posing a strange but fascinating
question, Vernes asks why we trust our senses
in this case, rather than dismissing the repetition as illusory and trusting instead in the infinite possibilities offered by our reason. The answer, as he sees it, lies in the same principle
“which . . . allows a dice-player to suspect . . .
that a die that always lands on the same face is
most probably loaded” (131). We begin by
imagining a perfectly fair set of gambler’s
dice, symmetrical and homogeneous, with no
evident reason for one side to turn up more often than any other. We now calculate the probabilities of various dice-throws by means of
the following principle: “that which is equally
thinkable is equally possible. It is this quantitative equality of the thinkable and the possi-

ble that permits us to establish a calculus or
probability or frequency of an event when we
play a game of chance” (132). But if we find to
our surprise that a die continues to fall on the
same face after an hour’s worth of throws, we
will surely begin to suspect a secret cause for
this result—perhaps a piece of lead hidden inside it. Our suspicions will surely increase if
we learn that the die has fallen on the same face
for our entire lifetimes, or in all of human
memory: especially if we are playing with a
die having millions or trillions of faces rather
than the usual six. What impels our belief in a
secret cause is the apparent contrast between
the countless possible results of the dice-throw
and the single outcome that recurs repeatedly.
Like our imaginary gambler, Hume and Kant
assume that if there were true contingency in
the dice-throw, it ought to be manifest in the
form of wildly varying results. Essentially,
they take the probabilistic reasoning with
which a gambler concludes that a die is loaded,
and transfer it to the universe as a whole. Out of
an immense total of thinkable (i.e., non-contradictory) universes, the familiar conditions
of our own universe always seem to be repeated. Even when cutting-edge physics uncovers some bizarre new phenomenon, this
merely gives unexpected insight into our existing universe; no one thinks that it marks a chaotic transformation in the very laws of our universe. From all of this, one concludes that there
must be some extra-logical, extra-mathematical force governing the “universe-die” so as to
give it the constant conditions that we witness.
Vernes calls this secret force “matter,” but
Meillassoux finds it so vague and mysterious
that we might just as well call it “providence”
(134). In any case, the inference of Hume and
Kant runs as follows: “if the laws are actually
capable of being modified without reason, it
would be ‘infinitely’ improbable that they are
not modified frequently” (ibid.).
Meillassoux’s critique of this inference is
highly inventive, though not as immediately
convincing (to me, at least) as some of the
other arguments in his book. As he sees it, the
basic presupposition of the “frequentialist”
standpoint is that it equates the being of the
possible with the being of a total conceivable
numerical sum of possibilities—even if this
sum is regarded as infinite. And “this line of
probabilist reasoning is valid only on the con-

A NEW FRENCH PHILOSOPHER
113
© DePaul University 2007

dition that what is possible a priori is thinkable
in the manner of a numerical totality” (139). In
order for Vernes’ defense of Hume and Kant to
work, he needs to assume that the sum total of
conceivable events is greater than the total
stock of experimental results. The larger the
total of possible events, or the larger the number of faces on the universe-die, all the greater
is the probability that the stable universe of our
experience results from a cryptic physical necessity lying hidden from view. It is here that
Meillassoux invokes Cantor, and Badiou’s
philosophical appropriation of him, in an effort to undercut the supposition that we can
speak of a totality of possible events at all
(139–42). The quantity of quantities is not just
too big to think about—it actually does not exist in light of the endless series of transfinite
numbers, none of them ever the greatest possible one (144). In other words, there is no sum
of possibilities, and hence the basically statistical argument of the frequentialists collapses.
Or at least this is true under at least one axiomatic system (Meillassoux, like Badiou, cites
Zermelo-Fraenkel [142]), and this is enough to
suspend any overwhelming discrepancy between a limited pattern of recurring physical
events and a mighty ocean of total possible
conceivable events. Moreover, any theory of
chance always relies on the deeper assumption
of an underlying physical law within which
chance plays out:
an aleatory series can be constituted only on
condition that the die preserves its structure
from one throw to the next, and that the laws that
permit the throws to take place are not modified
from one roll to the next. If the die were to implode, become spherical or flat, multiply its
faces by a thousandfold, etc., from one throw to
the next; or if gravity ceased to act and the die
flew off into the air, or were projected instead
beneath the surface of the earth, etc., from one
throw to the next; if this were so, no aleatory series, no calculus of probabilities, could ever
take place. (135–56)

That is to say, even the wildest games of
chance unfold only within a field defined by
certain unvarying laws. But Meillassoux’s
views on absolute contingency prevent us
from taking refuge in any final ground of necessary physical laws, since this would presup-

pose the very issue under dispute. In this way,
stripped of its framework of necessity, true
chance even becomes impossible.
As I read it, Meillassoux’s present book
merely tries to show that the apparent stability
of physical events in no way implies their necessity. As he himself admits, what is needed
to make his unorthodox stance on nature fully
convincing is to show a way for stability to
arise despite absolute contingency. This would
then allow us to apply Ockham’s Razor to any
fruitless appeal to cryptic physical mechanisms (148). But Après la finitude only lays the
groundwork for such a tactic, since it does not
firmly establish the needed resolution to
Hume’s problem: “for a . . . proposed resolution of Hume’s problem would be obliged to
derive the non-totalizability of the possible
from the principle of factuality itself” (152).
Yet there is little cause for complaint, since this
short book already achieves so much that most
readers will gladly wait a few more years for a
fuller treatment of contingency.
In closing these middle sections of the book
(we have dealt with the final chapter above),
Meillassoux insists that the famous problems
of metaphysics are real, and deserve to be
treated with respect. It is no longer a true philosophical attitude to smirk ironically at questions from beginners such as “who are we?” or
“where do we come from?” (151). In his view
(as in my own), the recent tendency by philosophers to smirk at supposed “pseudo-problems” is merely a result of the correlational circle—which confines itself to an increasingly
decrepit citadel of human access to the world,
and regards as “naïve” any attempt to venture
into a supposed wasteland-in-itself beyond the
fortress. But while Meillassoux does not find
metaphysical questions naïve or meaningless,
he also does not find them mysterious: “there
is no longer any mystery, not because there is
no longer any problem, but because there is no
longer any reason” (152). In his eyes, what philosophy most needs is an absolute and
mathematized Cartesian version of the an sich,
not just a mysteriously withdrawn Kantian
one: a “mathematical and not merely logical
restoration of a reality regarded as independent
of the existence of thought” (153). This
mathematized absolute will provide the key
for bridging what Meillassoux regards as the
two central themes of his book, and perhaps of
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his thinking in general: (1) the ancestral
archifossil, and (2) the problem of how
stability emerges from absolute contingency
(ibid.).
Hyper-Occasionalism
Anyone familiar with recent continental
philosophy is likely to find Meillassoux’s book
refreshing. He abandons the more or less cautious hermeneutics of human finitude that
Heidegger established as a basic philosophical
method, replacing it with remorseless logical
deduction. Stylistically, he prefers rational argumentation to the “close reading” exegesis of
classic texts, and in this respect he has much in
common with mainstream analytic thought.
He captures the reader’s attention by minutely
describing the contours of any philosophical
position, depicting it from numerous angles by
means of variant and contrary positions, employing a wealth of brilliant counterarguments
that often flood the reader’s mind even before
the initial position has been mastered. In this
sense, Meillassoux shows both a Hegelian talent for dialectical variation and a Cartesian gift
for lucid, step-by-step inference. And while
his faith in reason and contempt for obscurantism may strike some readers as too confident
in our power to fathom the depths of the world,
this style of thinking is a badly needed counterpoint to the dominant music of infinite otherness and withdrawn grounds beneath grounds
that has become the near-ubiquitous soundtrack of continental philosophy. Best of all,
Meillassoux never passes the buck to dead
mentors or hedges his bets behind meandering
prose; he sticks his neck out in every section of
the book, and most available knives are too
dull to place him in any danger. For this reader
at least, Après la finitude opens unheard-of
possibilities for the future of French philosophy, and tends to restore a good deal of
optimism concerning the power of human
reason to know the world. Challenges of this
order come only from works of the highest
intellectual caliber.
Meillassoux is an explicit champion of
what he calls hyper-chaos, or perhaps hypercontingency. Only while writing this review
did it occur to me that this actually makes him a
hyper-occasionalist, perhaps the most extreme
occasionalist who has ever lived. Since this

claim will sound as strange to the reader as to
Meillassoux himself, it calls for a bit of
explanation.
Occasionalism is generally remembered as
a minor, dusty, and gratuitous theological doctrine in which God intervenes at every moment
to link mind and body, and more generally to
link any objects at all. It is often restricted to
Malebranche and a small number of his intellectual cousins. Indeed, specialists in modern
philosophy often strike down all efforts to apply this term even to Descartes, let alone to
Spinoza, Leibniz, and Berkeley. In my view,
this restriction is unjustified, and the term
should be given a far broader scope than is normally the case. For what is most pivotal about
occasionalism is not any particular theology,
but rather the idea that entities in the world exist only side by side, without any connection
with one another. This model is obviously
found not only in Islamic figures such as alAsh‘ari and al-Ghazali, and full-blown Christian occasionalists such as Malebranche, but in
a broad range of modern philosophers. As Steven Nadler has shown,9 precisely the same argument about the side-by-side character of
things is even what guides Hume and his medieval forerunner Nicolas d’Autrécourt. Strictly
speaking, occasionalism in its purest form
would be impossible, since we would be left
with a multitude of side-by-side micro-universes, none of them communicating with the
others in even the least fashion. This is why
each form of occasionalism has had to allow itself a single hypocritical exception to the usual
ban on interaction. For the theological occasionalists, this exception is obviously God,
who is granted the unique ability to affect the
things in the world: even fire cannot burn cotton, but God can make it burn. In “skeptical occasionalists” such as Hume, the hypocritical
exception is found in the human mind, which
links fire and cotton through the force of
custom (even if nothing in the outside world
corresponds to such a link).
Meillassoux’s philosophy can be read as a
more extreme form of occasionalism than either of these schools. In his system there is no
God able to do what inherent causal power
cannot accomplish, since he excludes all necessary beings. Nor does he merely say, with
Hume, that we “cannot know” whether causal
powers exist—after all, Meillassoux states ab-
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solutely that there is no reason, no cause for
anything to happen. His occasionalism is not
merely a de-linking of distinct entities viewed
from the standpoint of human knowledge, but
an explicit decree about the ancestral things
themselves. He leaves us with a cosmos of utterly isolated entities, none capable of exerting
determinative forces against the others.
It remains to be seen how Meillassoux’s future work will explain the emergence of apparent stability in nature from the hyper-contingency to which he feels bound. For the
moment, however, there is a possible objection
to his manner of stating the problem. He argues
convincingly that philosophy is capable of absolute statements about things themselves, and
is in no way confined to the correlationist’s
things themselves “for us.” Even so, the ancestral realm in his work still functions solely as a
mechanism for absolutizing the correlational
circle; indeed, his method of obtaining the absolute arises directly from a radicalization of
the correlational predicament itself. In this respect, he seems more concerned with the absolute status of scientific knowledge of the things
themselves than with the ontological structure
of these things apart from all knowledge. If this
objection seems too subtle, it becomes more
vivid if we ask about the relation of ancestral
things with each other rather than just their inability to be reduced to a human-world correlate. Nowhere in the present book do we find a
discussion of how the ancestral structure of fire
exceeds its relation to cotton; for Meillassoux
it is only human knowledge, not relationality
in general, that finds itself perplexed by the
archifossil. Stated differently, the problem is
not just why it seems to us that fire always
burns cotton even though there is absolutely no
reason for this to happen. The real problem is
why fire and cotton themselves are able to give
rise to an event even though there is no longer

any connection between these two entities. In
other words, causation is not just an apparent
phenomenon that arises in human awareness
without reason, but something that actually
unfolds between entities themselves without
reason. In the current version of Meillassoux’s
project, there remains the possible objection
that, even though the archifossil is something
existing entirely in itself, independently of all
correlation or rapport, it is still invoked only as
the dark excess or underbelly of the correlate
itself. An analogous problem is found in
Badiou’s “inconsistent multiplicity,”10 which
seems to do nothing other than constantly undercut the human count-as-one and occasionally surprise us in various novel truth-events. If
inconsistent multiplicity merely remains beyond all counts as a non-totalizable excess,
and no part of it ever acts against any other
part, it thereby effectively functions as a one
despite Badiou’s claims to the contrary. More
importantly, it will have no structure in its own
right, and we will find ourselves saying almost
nothing about the nature of the world itself. A
true hyper-occasionalism would have to avoid
relapse into human knowledge as the single ultimate arbiter of a world without sufficient reason. This can happen only if we deal explicitly
with the interaction of separate inanimate entities outside the scope of human awareness—
including ancestral scientific knowledge.
Although I would not call this difficulty
“minor,” it is still a specific and limited issue,
and one fully open to debate. Après la finitude
is an important book of philosophy by an author who is clearly one of the most talented
emerging voices in continental thought.
Quentin Meillassoux deserves our close attention in the years to come, and his book deserves rapid translation and widespread discussion in the English-speaking world. There
is nothing quite like it.
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